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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the association between corporate governance and 
earnings management practices of Australian’s financially distressed firms. 
Based on a sample of 164 firm-year incorporating non-financial firms 
experiencing financial distress, the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) 
model is used to measure discretionary accruals (the proxy for earnings 
management). Board of directors and audit committee characteristic 
variables are employed as the key predictor variables for measuring the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. This study finds that the companies 
are seeking to reduce their reported earnings to increase the likelihood of 
making a profit in the following year with the goal of avoiding bankruptcy; 
a larger number of directors on a board is less effective in detecting 
and constraining the practices of earnings management by managers of 
distressed firms; an active audit committee plays a positive role in detecting 
and reducing the probability of earnings management. The findings of this 
study have implications especially to regulators and corporate governance 
reformists that determine corporate governance rules. This is primarily 
in regard to the efforts made by listed companies in maintaining their 
sustainability through more emphases on the process for monitoring and 
selection of board of directors and audit committee members to reinforce 
effectiveness in managerial performance evaluation.
Keywords: Bankruptcy; corporate governance; distressed firms; earnings 
management; Australia 
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INTRODUCTION
Organizational roles of the board of directors and special committees in 
the corporate governance become more crucial in the context of financial 
sustainability. The purpose of this study is to further investigate the 
practices of corporate governance and earnings management of firms with 
financial distress standing. Although corporate distress has been a topic 
of research interest for many years, the practice of earnings management 
of Australian firms with financial distress standing has received relatively 
little attention. Shahwan (2015) documents that the association between 
financially distressed firms and corporate governance has become an 
academic debate since 1980s. Whilst, several studies (e.g. Abdullah, 2006; 
Kesner, Victor & Lamont, 1986; Levitt, 1998) indicate that corporate failures 
have led to criticism of corporate governance systems. They suspect that 
boards of directors and audit committees are not doing their jobs well. 
Furthermore, Demirkan and Platt  (2009), Dimitras, Kyriakou and Iatridis 
(2015) and Segal and Segal (2016) did find that the quality of corporate 
governance plays a significant role in the decision to exercise earnings 
management in financially distressed firms. However, research into the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating earnings management 
behaviours in financially distressed firms in Australia is lacking. This study 
provides further evidence of the relationship between corporate governance 
monitoring mechanisms and the level of earnings management in firms 
having financial distress standing in Australia for a twenty-year period 
from 1989 to 2008. This data is from a domestic setting that has not been 
investigated previously. The reasons for selecting Australia are, firstly, 
the Australian economy maintained strong growth throughout the entire 
study period. Therefore, in such a robust environment, distressed firms 
are of special interest. Secondly, Australia follows free market policies 
like the United States. We seek to provide external validation of the 
results documented based on studies on the largely US market. Our study 
contributes to the international understanding of the empirical question 
that, in the past, has been drawn on data from the United States (Charitou, 
Lambertides & Trigeorgis, 2007; Demirkan & Platt, 2009), Canada (Elloumi 
& Gueyie, 2001),  Germany (Jostarndt & Sautner, 2008), China (Chen, Chen 
& Huang, 2010; Hui & Jing, 2008; Li, Wang & Deng, 2008), Spanish (Ajona, 
Dallo & Alegria, 2008), Malaysia (Abdullah, 2006; Rahmat & Iskandar, 
2009), Taiwan (Chang, 2009), Mexico (Price, Roman & Rountree, 2011), 
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and Europe (Dimitras et al., 2015). In the Australian context, Hensher and 
Jones (2007); and Chancharat, Davy, McCrae and Tian (2010) examine the 
determinants of multiple states of corporate financial distress. This study 
is one of the first1 to analyse corporate governance in Australian firms with 
financial distress standing.
Our study provides empirical evidence to fill the gap in the literature, 
whilst it may seem intuitive that earnings management and corporate 
governance linkage for financially healthy firms is also true for financially 
distressed firms. There have already been a considerable number of studies 
examining the corporate governance and earnings management practices 
that are carried out for financially healthy companies (e.g. Garcia-Meca & 
Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009; Hazarika, Karpoff & Nahata, 2012; Hutchinson, 
Percy & Erkurtoglu, 2008; Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Lo, Raymond & Firth, 
2010; Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2005; Xie, Davidson & DaDalt, 2003; 
Zgami & Halioui, 2016). 
Additionally, Shahwan (2015) investigates the quality of corporate 
governance practices and their impact on firm performance and financial 
distress. Whilst, most other previous studies investigate the association 
between financial distress and corporate governance that falls into the basic 
stream of studies aiming at clarifying whether the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management practices in 
healthy firms differs from those in distressed firms and their impact on the 
probability of default (Al-Tamal-Tamimi, 2012; Swain, 2009). Previous 
studies on financial distressed firms, such as Muranda (2006) are mainly 
concerned with the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
survival of distressed firms. This study completes previous research in 
two ways. First, it focuses on firms that are already in financial distress 
standing. Second, it provides useful information on the relationship between 
earnings management and some corporate governance’s characteristics of 
 
1  Izan 1984, ‘Corporate distress in Australia’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
8: 303–320 examines the indications of Australian corporate distressed 
firms. Whilst, Davidson, et al. 2005, ‘Internal governance structures and 
earnings management’ Accounting and Finance, 45, 2: 241–267 investigate 
the association between internal governance characteristics and earnings 
management in Australian normal or healthy companies.
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the financial years prior to reaching a distress standing of Australian firms, 
whilst it also controls firms’ financial characteristics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the theoretical 
framework underlying corporate governance and earnings management 
linkages. Section 3 outlines the research design. The primary results 
including descriptive statistics, correlations and regression analysis are then 
presented in Section 4. Conclusions and implications for future research 
are discussed in the final section.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Managers of distressed firms are more likely to manage their reported 
earnings to conceal or postpone a firm’s distressed condition (e.g. 
Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Campa & Camacho-Minano, 2015; Charitou 
et al., 2007; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1994; Gombola, Ho & Huang, 2016; 
Lin, Lo & Wu, 2016; Rosner, 2003). Earnings management is intended to 
conceal the true reporting earnings figure and has potentially negative effects 
on investors’ interests. This need to protect shareholders’ rights leads to the 
need to monitor management behaviour. To ensure that managers act in the 
best interests of the shareholders, the board of directors is charged with the 
task of monitoring the activities of management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
The theoretical linkage between corporate governance and financial 
distress originates from organizational theory literature. The literature 
reports that the effectiveness of boards in protecting the shareholders’ 
value is associated with the independence of a board of directors (Dechow, 
Ge & Schrand, 2010). Furthermore, Kim, Liao & Wang (2015) and Ye 
(2014) find that the portion between insider and independent directors as 
representation on boards influences a firm’s financial condition through the 
board involvement in the strategic decision making process. Fama (1980) 
suggests that the domination of the board of directors by top management 
and the deficiency of involvement of the independent directors of the board 
directors in the strategic decision making can lead to conspiracy and transfer 
of stockholder wealth and this condition may be extremely harmful to the 
firm during a period of financial distress. The lack of involvement in strategic 
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decision making by an independent director may be a potential explanation 
of distress which is supported by Elloumi and Gueyie (2001) who find that 
firms in persistent financial distress tend to have weak corporate governance. 
Previous studies that investigate the association between corporate 
governance and financial distress also document that dominant CEOs tend 
to be associated with firm bankruptcy (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992) and 
the percentage of insider directors is higher on boards of declining firms 
(Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992). However, the implications of an economics 
approach to the organizational theory as a system of negotiations has not 
been well developed and agency theory has been widely used to examine 
organizations from a transaction perspective. This study refers to the agency 
theory in developing the hypotheses that explain the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings management.
Using a sample of US and Chinese firms, Klein (2002) and Firth, Fung 
and Rui (2007), respectively, report a negative association between board 
independence and the magnitude of earnings management. In addition, 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) reveal that the greater the proportion 
of independent directors the less likely a firm is to be subjected to SEC 
enforcement actions for violations of U.S. GAAP. Expanding this rationale 
and based on the theoretical framework, it is suggested that managers of 
distressed firms are more likely to manage their reported earnings to conceal 
or postpone a firm’s distressed condition (e.g. Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; 
Charitou et al., 2007; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1994; Rosner, 2003).
Furthermore, the majority of previous studies investigating the 
relationship between a board of directors’ composition and firm value 
concentrates on the role of the board at large; however, a great deal of the 
board’s decision making occurs at the committee level (Ellstrand, Daily & 
Johnson, 1999). It is expected that this committee provides shareholders 
with the greatest protection in maintaining the reliability and credibility of 
a company’s financial statements (Bradbury, 1990). The study of United 
Kingdom firms by Collier (1993b) suggests that firms establish audit 
committees to alleviate their agency problem and reduce information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Evidence from prior studies 
shows that the formation of audit committees associates positively with the 
informativeness of reported earnings (Mitra, Hossain & Deis, 2007) and less 
financial fraud (Dechow et al., 1996; McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996). 
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The audit committee plays a key role in assisting the board of directors 
to fulfil its corporate governance and oversight responsibilities in issues 
relevant to the integrity of a company’s financial reporting. Prior literature 
indicates that the effectiveness of an audit committee is dependent on its 
objectivity as audit committees can play an important role in the financial 
reporting process and in stimulating the audit quality (Bedard, Chtourou & 
Courteau, 2004; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2005; Kasipillai & 
Mahenthiran, 2013). An audit committee would ideally be composed entirely 
of non-executive or independent directors (Lipton & Lorch, 1992; Menon & 
Williams, 1994). This argument is consistent with the finding of Yin, Gaou, 
Li and Lu (2015) that audit committee independence is associated with a 
higher degree of active oversight and Jiambalvo (1996) that audit committee 
independence is associated with a lower incidence of financial statements 
fraud. Expanding this rationale of its objectivity or independence to financial 
distress, one can assume that the effectiveness of an audit committee in 
financially distressed firms is expected to be the same as that of in healthy 
firms. The audit committee plays an important role in reducing earning 
management initiated by the management of an organization. Previous 
studies document that audit committees are associated with lower levels 
of earnings management (Badolato, Donelson & Ege, 2014). Based on the 
above reasoning, we hypothesise that:
H
1a
:  There is a negative association between the proportion of 
independent directors of the board of directors in financially distressed 
firms and the level of earnings management.
H
1b
:  There is a negative association between the proportion of 
independent members of the audit committee in financially distressed firms 
and the level of earnings management. 
The literature has documented that meeting frequency indicates 
the effectiveness both in the case of board of directors’ as well as audit 
committees’ functionality (Greco, 2011; Sharma, Naicker & Lee, 2009). 
Board and audit committee meeting frequency has been used as a proxy for 
the level of monitoring an activity (Greco, 2011; Wijethilake, Ekanayake & 
Parera, 2015). A primary impediment to board of directors’ effectiveness is 
a lack of time spent in executing their duties (Lipton & Lorch, 1992) and 
Vafeas (1999) did argue that an increase in the number of board meetings 
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might enhance the level of oversight of the financial reporting process, 
thereby improving board performance. Cohen, Hayes, Krishnamoorthy, 
Monroe and Wright (2016) further suggest that when the meetings between 
auditors and the audit committee are more frequent, then the audit committee 
becomes more involved and issues discussed are more substantive. Past 
research also supports the importance of audit committee meeting frequency. 
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides (2000) document that audit 
committees of “reputable” companies meet more often than those companies 
later convicted of fraudulent activities. Additionally, audit committees of 
companies that meet at least four times a year are less likely to have restated 
their financial statements (Abbott, Parker & Peter, 2004). Furthermore, 
Xie et al. (2003) also provide an evidence that audit committee meeting 
frequency is negatively related to the levels of discretionary accruals. 
Expanding this reasoning to financial distressed firms that finally reach a 
financial distress standing, we hypothesize, bifurcated to take into account 
both board of directors’ meeting frequency as well as audit committee 
meeting frequency that: 
H
2a
:   There is a negative association between the board of directors’ 
meeting frequency in financially distressed firms and the level of earnings 
management.
H
2b
:   There is a negative association between the audit committee 
meeting frequency in financially distressed firms and the level of earnings 
management.
Many empirical studies have sought to find the optimal size of 
a company’s governing boards. Study on data from an international 
comparison incorporating French and Canadian listed companies, Jouber 
and Fakhfakh (2012) document that an effective board of directors is able 
to provide a monitoring mechanism to ensure a high quality of earnings. 
Uzun, Szewezyk and Varma (2004) find that the board size is larger for fraud 
companies than no fraud companies. Huther (1997) suggests that, as in any 
other decision making body, governing boards face coordination problems. 
These problems increase as the size of governing boards increases. 
More recently, Pucheta-Martinez and Garcia-Meca (2014) document 
that audit committees and board structure and composition significantly 
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enhance financial reporting quality. However, there is a mixed evidence 
in the relation between audit committees and the board’s structure and 
composition. Fodio, Ibikunle and Oba (2013) find that audit committee 
size is significant and negatively associated with discretionary accruals. 
Whilst, He and Yang (2014) suggest that audit committee size is positively 
associated with earnings management. Thus, the influence of the audit 
committee and board structure on earnings management documents mixed 
directions; the direction of the earnings management could be income-
increasing or income-decreasing. Expanding this rationale to financial 
distress, one can assume that financial distress experienced by firms 
provides incentives to managers for earnings manipulation. In this study, 
we investigate empirically the effectiveness of the audit committee and 
board structure in firms prior to the financial distress standing. Based on 
these prior findings, we hypothesize that:
H
3a
:  There is an association between the number of directors on a 
board in financially distressed firms and the level of earnings management
H
3b
:  There is an association between the number of members on an 
audit committee in financially distressed firms and the level of earnings 
management.
Yasser and Al Mamun (2015) and Stockmans, Lybaert and Voordeckers 
(2013) investigate the influence of CEO duality on earnings management. 
They document that CEO duality, where there is a dual role in that the CEO 
is also the chairman of the board, causes dysfunctional audit committee. 
They find that CEO duality positively influences the level of earnings 
management.  Previous studies of CEO duality on distressed firms also find 
that CEO duality in distressed firms is more likely to experience bankruptcy. 
For example, Daily and Dalton (1994) report that firms with the CEO acting 
as the board chairman are more likely to go bankrupt than those firms that 
have separately designated roles for the CEO and the board chair. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that:
H
4
:  There is a positive association between CEO duality in financially 
distressed firms and the level of earnings management. 
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Overall it is posited that these hypotheses will help predict the extent 
of earning management in financially distressed firms in the periods prior 
to and in the year that a firm finally reaches a financial distress standing.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This study focuses on Australian firms with financial distress standing. The 
data population of this study are extracted from the ORBIS databases of 
Bureau Van Dijk (BvD). To be included in the analyses, firms must meet two 
criteria. Firstly, each firm must have been in a financial distress standing. 
In this study, we extracted financially distressed firms defined as those are 
classified as bankrupt, dissolved, in liquidation or inactive (companies that 
are no longer listed following, for example, a takeover or merger due to 
the financial difficulties). Secondly, each firm must have its annual reports 
available. 
In this study, we identify Australian non-financial firms that fall 
into a categorization as financial distressed firms by ORBIS databases of 
Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) occurring between the periods of 1998 and 2008. 
Then, we match the firms with their annual reports availability. There were 
68 firms with a financial distress standing, having their annual reports 
available.  Then, we use the financial data of those 68 firms. We examined 
the financial data of those firms for six years prior to the distress standing 
plus that of the year of distress standing for each firm. The corporate 
governance information is hand collected from each firm’s annual report. 
Then, we scrutinized all of those 68 firms with financial distress standing 
occurring in the periods of 1998 and 2008 that forms an imbalanced panel 
of 272 firm-year. The panel is imbalanced because firms reach their financial 
distress standing occur in different years during the period of the study. 
Nevertheless, the estimations based on the imbalanced panels are as reliable 
as those based on the balanced panels (Pucheta-Martinez & Garcia-Meca, 
2014). For the technical analysis, we need one extra year’s data to compute 
discretionary accruals; that is a proxy for earnings management. Of the 272 
firm-year, there were 204 observations providing a complete data set to 
compute discretionary accruals. However, 40 of the 204 observations for 
the control variables data was not available. Finally, this study is based on a 
final sample of 164 firm-year incorporating non-financial firms experiencing 
financial distressed.
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 This study uses discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings 
management. Consistent with contemporary studies in earnings management, 
this study focuses on the absolute (unsigned or non-directional) value 
rather than the actual sign of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management. The magnitude of unsigned discretionary accruals is the best 
measure to indicate the opportunistic behaviour of management without any 
concern as to whether they manage earnings number upwards or downwards 
(Ferguson, Seow & Young, 2004; Francis, Maydew & Sparks, 1999; Walker, 
2004). Prior to estimating discretionary accruals, total accruals (‘TAC’) are 
calculated as:
TACjt = (∆CAjt - ∆Cashjt) – (∆CLjt - ∆LTDjt - ∆ITPjt) - DPAjt 
 
Where: TACjt = total accruals for firm j in time period t; ∆CAjt = change in 
current assets for firm j from time period t-1 to t; ∆Cashjt = change in cash 
balance for firm j from time period   t-1 to t; ∆CLjt   = change in current 
liabilities for firm j from time period t-1 to t; ∆LTDjt   = change in long-
term debt included in current liabilities for firm k from time period t-1 to 
t; ∆ITPjt = change in income tax payable for firm j from time period t-1 to 
t; and DPAjt    = depreciation and amortization expense for firm j from time 
period to t.
TAC then is decomposed into normal accruals (‘NAC’) and 
discretionary accruals (‘DAC’) using the cross-sectional modified 
Jones (1991) model2 defined formally as:
TAC jk,t / TAjk,t-1 = α jt [1/ TAjk,t-1] +βjt [(∆REVjk,t - ∆RECjk,t)/ TAjk,t-1] 
+  γj,t [PPEjk,t / TAjk,t-1] + εjk,t    
Where: TAC jk,t = total accruals for firm j in industry k in year t; TAjk,t-1 
= total assets for firm j in industry k at the end of year t-1; ∆REVjk,t 
= change in net sales for firm j in industry k between years t-1 and 
t; ∆RECjk,t = change in receivables for firm j in industry k between 
years t-1 and t; PPEjk,t = gross property, plant and equipment for firm 
j in industry k in the year t; αj, βj, γj = industry specific estimated 
coefficients; and εj = error term.
2  We also estimate discretionary accruals using alternative techniques by inclusion (in separate 
estimations) to the modified Jones (1991) model of (a) cash flow operating activities (Dechow, 1994; 
Kim et al., 2003) and (b) return on assets (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Kothari et al., 2005). Findings 
using alternative discretionary accruals model estimates are not yielding any significant qualitative 
differences to the main result.
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NAC is defined as the fitted values from Equation 2 whilst 
DAC is the residual (TAC minus NAC). As discussed above, we use 
seven different measures of governance monitoring mechanisms 
from the past literature. These governance mechanisms are grouped 
by those that relate to the board of directors and those that relate to 
audit committees: the CEO duality and the number of, independence 
and meeting frequency of board of directors (Abdullah, 2006; Boo 
& Sharma, 2008; Carcello et al., 2002; Chang, 2009; O’Sullivan, 
2000); and audit committee size, audit committee independence and 
the number of audit committee meetings (Abbott et al., 2004; Boo & 
Sharma, 2008; Rahmat & Iskandar, 2009; Stewart & Munro, 2007).
To enhance the explanatory power and fit of the regression model, the 
following control variables are used: leverage, firm size, auditor quality and 
type of industry.3 Following prior earnings management studies (e.g. Becker, 
DeFond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam, 1998; Chen et al., 2010; Davidson 
et al., 2005; Francis, Reichelt & Wang, 2005; Frankel, Johnson & Nelson, 
2002; Godfrey & Koh, 1998; Gul, Chen & Tsui, 2003), we predict that the 
coefficients of leverage and industry will be positive whereas the audit 
quality and firm size will be negative. Proxy measures for the dependent, 
independent and control variables are explained in the following research 
model.
To test our hypotheses, we develop the following multivariate model:
Where, 
AbsDAC: Absolute DACs firm i for year t measured by Modified Jones 
(1991) model.
3 We classify companies into high and low profile industries. High profile industries appear as 
industries with consumer visibility, a high level of political risk, and concentrated, intense 
competition (Roberts, 1992). In this study, high profile industries are defined as those from 
agriculture, mining, basic industry and chemicals, consumer goods, and property, real estate and 
building construction. 
	
To test our hypotheses, we develop the following multivariate model: 
 
AbsDACi = ai +ai1%IndBODi + ai2%IndAudComi + ai3BODFreqi + ai4AudComFreqi 
+ai5BODSizei + ai6AudComSizei + ai7Dualityi +ai8FSizei + ai9Leveragei + 
ai10AuditQualityi +ai11Industryi + εi 
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%IndBOD: Percentage of non-executive directors on the board of firm i 
for their fiscal year t.
%IndAudCom: Percentage of the audit committee members are non-
executive directors
BODFreq: Frequency of board meetings of firm i for their fiscal year t.
AudComFreq: Frequency of audit committee meeting of firm i for their 
fiscal year t.
BODSize: Total number of board members of firm i for their fiscal year t.
AudComSize: Total number of audit committee members of firm i for their 
fiscal year t.
Duality: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if the board chairman 
and CEO roles are combined; otherwise scored zero (0).
FSize: Natural logarithm of the total sales of firm i for their fiscal year t.
Leverage: Ratio of total debt of firm i for year t to total owners’ equity of 
firm i for year t.
Audit Quality Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if its auditor in 
fiscal year t is a Big-4 firm; otherwise scored zero (0).
Industry: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if high profile 
industries (from the agriculture; mining; basic industry and chemicals; 
consumer goods; property, real estate and building construction); otherwise 
scored zero (0).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 reports the mean figures of leverage, return on assets (‘ROA’) 
and accruals performance for the sample firms from six years prior to the 
bankruptcy filing (t-6) to the year of bankruptcy.
As shown in Table 1, the level of debt to the total owner’s equity 
(Leverage) increases significantly starting at five years prior to bankruptcy-
filing reaching the highest level in t-2 (74%). A recovery seems to occur 
in t-1 (-70%), falling to the lowest level around the event year (-32%). 
Return on assets also drops consistently from t-6 to three years prior to 
bankruptcy-filing (from -1% to -37%). A recovery takes place in t-2 (-9%). 
The accounting earnings falls to its lowest performance in t -1 (-98%) 
increasing significantly in the event year (-2%). Overall, there is a clear 
and consistent decline in financial performance indicating serious financial 
problems in the sample firms (see Figure 1).
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Table 1: Mean Leverage, ROA and Accruals Levels
Year -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
Leverage 39.83 39.37 53.56 58.13 74.32 69.74 31.90
ROA -1.17 -7.59 -23.07 -37.26 -9.46 -98.46 -1.67
TAC -0.0484 -0.0545 -0.2737 0.1513 -0.0192 -0.2446 0.1256
DAC 0.0064 0.0157 -0.0247 0.0503 0.0379 -0.0026 -0.0746
N 7 18 23 33 40 38 5
  Legend: Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total owners’ equity; ROA (return on assets) is the ratio of net  income to 
total assets; TAC is the total accruals; DAC is the discretionary accruals
             
   -6    -5 -4 -3             -2 -1           0
               
                Legend: Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total owners’ equity; ROA (return on assets)  is the ratio of net  
                income to total assets.
Figure 1: Mean Leverage and ROA
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   - 6              -5               -4                -3  -2                -1                  0
                  
         Legend: TAC is the total accruals; DAC is the discretionary accruals.
Figure 2: Mean TAC and DAC
The behaviour of DAC, standardized by beginning-of-year total 
assets, follows a similar pattern to TAC. As shown in Table 1 and Figure 
2, DAC declines gradually from t-6 to t-4 and recovering at about t-3. 
Starting from t-3, both accruals (TAC and DAC) for a second time decline 
noticeably. Mean TAC decreases deeply compared to DAC. By t-1, TAC 
reaches its lowest level at -24% whilst the lowest level of DAC occurs at 
the bankruptcy-filling event (t 0). In summary, the negative performance of 
accruals, especially TAC, indicates that the sample firms are facing severe 
financial distress.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Dependent, Independent and 
Control Variables
Panel A– Continuous Variables
Mean Median Std Deviation Minimum Maximum
AbsDAC 0.13 0.07 0.15 0.01 0.75
%IndBOD 70.54 75.00 15.87 20.00 100.00
%IndAud-
Com 89.65 100.00 16.22 33.33 100.00
BODFreq 10.88 11.00 4.84 2 27
AudComFreq 3.53 3.00 2.05 1 16
BODSize 6.02 6.00 1.93 3 11
AudComSize 3.21 3.00 0.83 2 6
FSize (in 
thousand 
AUD)
653,438.77 120,453.00 1.476,517.42 317.00 10,487,800.00
Leverage 60.49 38.70 112.87 1.01 531.51
Panel B – Categorical Variables
Frequency  Percentage (%)
Duality:
    Board only 25 15.24
    Board and CEO 139 84.76
Audit Quality:
    Non Big 4 31 18.90
    Big 4 133 81.10
Industry:
    Low Profile 58 35.37
    High Profile 106 64.63 
Legend: 
AbsDAC: Absolute DACs firm i for year t measured by Modified Jones (1991) model. FSize: Natural logarithm of the total 
sales of firm i for their fiscal year t.
Leverage: Ratio of total debt of firm i for year t to total owners’ equity of firm i for year t.
Audit Quality Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if its auditor in fiscal year t is a Big-4 firm; otherwise scored  
zero (0).
Industry: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if high profile industries (from the agriculture; mining; basic industry 
and chemicals; consumer goods; property, real estate and building construction); otherwise scored zero (0).
BODSize: Total number of board members of firm i for their fiscal year t.
%IndBOD: Percentage of non-executive directors on the board of firm i for their fiscal year t.
BODFreq: Frequency of board meetings of firm i for their fiscal year t.
Duality: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if the board chairman and CEO roles are combined; otherwise scored 
zero (0).
AudComSize: Total number of audit committee members of firm i for their fiscal year t.
%IndAudCom: Percentage of the audit committee members are non-executive directors
AudComFreq: Frequency of audit committee meeting of firm i for their fiscal year t.
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Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent, 
independent and control variables. Panel A shows the descriptive 
statistics for the continuous variables in the regression model. Panel 
B exhibits details for the categorical variables.
As shown in Table 2, average absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (‘AbsDAC’) is 0.13% of the total assets at the beginning of 
the year. The sample firms have, on average, 6 and 3 members sitting 
on the board and audit committee respectively. On average, 71% of 
the directors on boards and 90% of the directors on audit committee 
are non-executive directors. The data reveals that around two thirds 
of the sample firms have 100% independent directors on their audit 
committees. Board of directors and audit committees hold, on average, 
11 and 3 meetings respectively in a typical financial year. The sample 
firms have a mean total average assets (‘FSize’) of $A653.4 million 
ranging from $A0.3 million to $A10.5 billion. Furthermore, average 
leverage of the sample firms is 60.49%.
Panel B of Table 2 indicates that 85% of board of directors 
is structured such that the board chairman and the CEO roles are 
combined (duality of positions). Additionally, 81% of the sample firms 
use the services of Big 4 audit firms. Finally, 65% of the Australia’s 
distressed firms in the sample are classified as being in high profile 
industries. 
Correlation Matrix
Table 3 provides a Pearson correlation matrix among the dependent, 
independent and control variables. 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix
%Ind
BOD
%Ind
AudCom
BODFreq Aud
ComFreq
BODSize Aud
ComSize
AbsDAC 0.006 -0.083 -0.014 -0.120 0.090 0.086
%IndBOD 0.235* 0.320* 0.261* 0.236* 0.248*
%IndAudCom 0.142 -0.008 0.034 -0.344*
BODFreq 0.219* 0.079 0.158**
AudComFreq 0.277* 0.414*
BODSize 0.422*
AudComSize
FSize
Leverage
Duality
Audit Quality
(continued)
Table 3 (continued): Pearson Correlation Matrix
Fzise Leverage Duality Audit Quality Industry
AbsDAC -0.101 -0.022 -0.022 -0.011 0.040
%IndBOD 0.254* 0.093 -0.268* 0.127 0.109
%IndAudCom 0.148 -0.171** -0.070 0.181* 0.215**
BODFreq 0.088 0.241* 0.081 0.001 -0.105
AudComFreq 0.252* 0.094 -0.089 0.011 0.124
BODSize 0.604* 0.188** -0.119 0.256* 0.093
AudComSize 0.263* 0.076 -0.139 0.158** 0.000
FSize 0.228* -0.137 0.326* -0.023
Leverage 0.056 0.078 0.140
Duality -0.031 -0.101
Audit Quality 0.001
Legend: * and ** indicate significance at p<0.01 and p<0.05 (based on two-tailed tests). 
AbsDAC: Absolute DACs firm i for year t measured by Modified Jones (1991) model. 
FSize: Natural logarithm of the total sales of firm i for their fiscal year t. Leverage: Ratio 
of total debt of firm i for year t to total owners’ equity of firm i for year t. Audit Quality 
Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if its auditor in fiscal year t is a Big-4 firm; 
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otherwise scored zero (0).
Industry: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if high profile industries (from 
the agriculture; mining; basic industry and chemicals; consumer goods; property, real estate 
and building construction); otherwise scored zero (0). BODSize: Total number of board 
members of firm i for their fiscal year t. %IndBOD: Percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board of firm i for their fiscal year t. BODFreq: Frequency of board meetings of firm 
i for their fiscal year t. Duality: Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if the board 
chairman and CEO roles are combined; otherwise scored zero (0). AudComSize: Total number 
of audit committee members of firm i for their fiscal year t. %IndAudCom: Percentage of the 
audit committee members are non-executive directors. AudComFreq: Frequency of audit 
committee meeting of firm i for their fiscal year t.
Pearson correlation results reported in Table 3 do not provide a 
comprehensive support for the study’s hypotheses. AbsDAC is negatively 
correlated with BODFreq, Duality, %IndAudCom and AudComFreq, but 
it is positively correlated with BODSize, %IndBOD and AudComSize. 
However, these relationships are not significant. There are some significant 
positive and negative correlations among the seven alternative measures of 
monitoring devices, with the correlation values ranging from 16% to 42%. 
In respect to correlations between independent and control variables, and 
amongst the control variables themselves, the highest correlations (r = 60%) 
are between BODSize and FSize. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix in 
which we notice that there are no high correlations among the variables 
across sample and hence multicollinearity is not a concern in the model 
estimations, which is confirmed by VIF as shown in Table 4.
Multivariate Main Results
The main results for testing the hypotheses are reported in Table 4. 
Table 4 reports that the regression model estimates are statistically significant 
(F-statistic p<0.01) with explanatory power of 5%. The achieved R2 level 
is common in studies examining corporate governance attributes (Rahmat 
& Iskandar, 2009). The results shown in Table 4 suggest that amongst 
our hypotheses, only Hypothesis 2b and Hypothesis 3a are statistically 
supported. Two variables (AudComFreq and BODSize) are significantly 
associated with the measure of earnings management as hypothesized. 
The independent variable AudComFreq is negatively and significantly 
related to AbsDAC. Therefore, the proposed hypothesis concerning a 
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negative association between the audit committee meeting frequency and 
the level of earnings management (H
2b
) is supported.  This finding suggests 
that an active audit committee plays an effective role in detecting and the 
reducing the probability of earnings management as hypothesized. This 
finding is consistent with the previous research (e.g. Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 
2003) that observes a negative association between the frequency of audit 
committee meetings and the magnitude of earnings management; however, 
our findings are one of the first to do so in an Australian context during a 
robust economic period. 
Table 4: Multiple Regression Results of Absdac as the Dependent Variable
Prediction Beta t-statistic VIF
(Constant) 2.533*
Independent Variables:
%IndBOD - 0.030 0.362 1.138
%IndAudCom - -0.020 -0.234 1.244
BODFreq - 0.007 0.091 1.058
AudComFreq - -0.177 -2.080** 1.242
BODSize - /+ 0.221 2.173** 1.284
AudComSize - /+ 0.124 1.388 1.377
Duality + -0.025 -0.325 1.032
Control Variables:
FSize - -0.223 -2.317** 1.594
Leverage + -0.006 -0.073 1.061
Audit Quality - -0.014 -0.172 1.145
Industry + 0.037 0.478 1.040
Model Summary:
R-Squared 0.075
Adj. R-Squared 0.051
F-Statistic 3.201*
Sample Size 164
 
              Legend: *, **, and *** indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively (based on two-tailed tests).
Table 5 shows the result of further scrutinization by employing 
Independent Sample T-tests. The result indicates that the AbsDAC is 
significantly lower (9% compared to 14%) when an audit committee meets 
at least four times a year.
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Table 4 also shows the positive and significant (at p<0.05) association 
between BODSize and AbsDAC (the measure of earnings management). 
This result supports the hyphothesis proposing an association between the 
number of directors on a board and the level of earnings management (H3a). 
This finding suggests that a relatively larger number of directors sitting on 
the board is indicative of a less effective board in detecting and constraining 
the practices of earnings management by the financially distressed firms in 
Australia. This result suggests the importance of keeping boards small in 
order to improve firm performance. A company will face communication, 
coordination and decision making effectiveness problems among a larger 
group of people than a smaller group. 
The variables %IndBOD, BODFreq, Duality, AudComSize and 
%IndAudCom are not statistically significant, thus, hypotheses 1, 2, 3a, 4b, 
and 5 are not supported. Therefore, our study provides useful information 
that these potential predictors for earnings management do not assist in 
explaining the behaviour for discretionary accruals of companies’ managers 
of Australia’s financially distressed firms. Corporate governance which 
could have a positive effect is only partially supported. Presumably, some 
of the distressed companies may have spent some of their final years in 
administration in order to comply with the legal requirements and other 
obligations on the information that disclosures to the administrators that 
they have to prepare. 
Table 5: T-test for Earnings Management and Audit Committee 
Meeting Frequency
N
AbsDAC (proxy for earnings management)
Mean SD t-value Sig
Up to four meetings 123 0.1352 0.1722 2.194 0.030
Above four meetings 41 0.0933 0.0709
164
Finally, none of the control variables are significantly associated 
with AbsDAC except for FSize. The negative and significant coefficient 
on FSize (at p<0.05) supports the notion that large size firms exhibit less 
aggressive behaviour in practising earnings management as hypothesized. 
This result strongly supports the political costs hypothesis, which argues 
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that in comparison to smaller firms, larger firms are subjected to more public 
scrutiny and political actions (Moses, 1987; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). 
CONCLUSION
This study finds a differential behaviour in financially distress firms in the 
financial years prior to and at the bankruptcy-filing event. A firm’s financial 
condition (leverage and ROA), in general, gradually gets worse from six 
years prior to bankruptcy. Following the decline of firms’ financial condition, 
in t-1, discretionary accruals are negative. The negative discretionary 
accruals continue to the event year (t), inferring that managers attempt 
to reduce reported earnings when they have recognized that loss in two 
consecutive years, especially at t-1, is unavoidable. It may be that our 
sample firms choose the “big bath”, an earnings management strategy 
that has been espoused in the accounting literature, by manipulating their 
earnings to make poor results even worse in the slowing economic period 
and thus artificially enhancing next year’s earnings (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 
2003; Walsh, Craig & Clarke, 1999). The “big bath” approach may equally 
apply to poorly performing firms; however, it does not seem to have been 
successful in avoiding a financial distress standing.
Findings from the regression analyses do not support the contention 
that the board of directors’ diligence, CEO duality, board independence, audit 
committee size, and audit committee independence explain the practices 
of earnings management in Australian firms with financial standing. This 
finding indicates the different behaviour which might exist in regards to 
governance structure and practices among firms with financial distress 
status and healthy firms. This study provides further empirical evidence on 
corporate governance and earnings management in Australian firms with 
the financial distress standing.
One important aspect in an Australian context is that we find that an 
active audit committee plays a positive role in detecting and reducing the 
probability of earnings management. Specifically, our results clearly reveal 
a negative association between audit committee meeting frequency and the 
magnitude of earnings management. This evidence is consistent with prior 
research, which suggests that the more frequently an audit committee meets 
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the more effective it is in carrying out its oversight and monitoring the role 
of managers’ activities (Collier, 1993a; Song & Windram, 2000; Vafeas, 
1999). Furthermore, our results imply that the role of the audit committee 
becomes more effective when it meets at least four times in a financial year.
Overall, our study provides an important insight into understanding 
the association between corporate governance practices and structures 
and the earnings management of Australian firms in financial distress 
standing. The findings reveal certain unique features in the Australian 
context. Corporate governance structures emanating from the full board 
of directors do not seem to impede earnings management for financially 
distressed firms. Unlike evidence from other countries’ study findings, CEO 
duality, percentage of non-executive directors and frequency of full board 
meetings seemingly have inconsequential effect on earnings management 
behaviour. Only a “smaller” number of full board members has an impact. 
However, the frequency of annual audit committee board meetings is a key 
influential factor in constraining an Australian financially distressed firm’s 
earnings management in the financial years prior to reaching a financial 
distress standing. The findings of this study have implications, especially 
for regulators and corporate governance reformists that determine corporate 
governance rules. Special attention needs to be given by Australian policy 
makers in strengthening the corporate governance framework. This is 
primarily in regard to the efforts made by listed companies in maintaining 
their sustainability through more emphases on the process for monitoring 
and selection of board of directors and audit committee members; as well 
as to reinforce effectiveness in managerial performance evaluation.
Finally, this study is not without certain caveats. One limitation in 
this study is the possible misspecification of the model estimated. Earnings 
management and monitoring mechanisms rely on proxy measures that, 
whilst previously used extensively in the research literature, are not 
free from criticism. For example, discretionary accrual models measure 
discretionary accruals with error (see Bernard & Skinner, 1996 for a 
deeper discussion). These problems, however, are endemic to the earnings 
management literature. Therefore, we also estimate discretionary accruals 
using alternative techniques by inclusion (in separate estimations) to the 
modified Jones (1991) model of (a) cash flow operating activities (Dechow, 
1994; Kim et al., 2003) and (b) return on assets (Ashbaugh, LaFond & 
Mayhew, 2003; Kothari, Leone & Wasley, 2005). Findings using alternative 
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discretionary accruals model estimates are not yielding any significant 
qualitative differences to the main result. A future research can also be 
carried out for a comparative study between firms with financial distress 
status across jurisdictions. A comparative study in this area of research 
between firms with financial distress and healthy firms can also be an 
interesting future investigation.  
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